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A CAUTIONARY NOTE ON TESTS FOR INCENTIVE
INCOMPATIBILITY AND STARTING-POINT BIAS
David Aadland and Arthur J. Caplan

ABSTRACT

In a recent study by John Whitehead in 2002 ("Incentive Incompatibility and StartingPoint Bias in Iterative Valuation Questions"), he proposes incentive-incompatibility and startingpoint-bias tests for iterative willingness-to-pay questions. We show that if restrictions associated
with the nature of starting-point bias are not imposed on the estimation, one obtains inconsistent
estimates of the structural parameters and may draw inaccurate conclusions regarding the extent
of incentive incompatibility and starting-point bias in contingent-valuation survey data.
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A CAUTIONARY NOTE ON TESTS FOR INCENTIVE
INCOMPATIBILITY AND STARTING-POINT BIAS 1*

1. Introduction

In a recent study, Whitehead (2002) proposes incentive-incompatibility and starting-

point-bias tests for iterative dichotomous-choice willingness-to-pay questions. The tests
represent a potentially important contribution because they provide a straightforward and
relatively simple method to detect and control for two well-documented problems associated
with discrete-choice contingent-valuation survey data (Boyle, Bishop, and Welsh, 1985; Herriges
and Shogren, 1996; Cameron and Quiggin, 1994; Alberini, Kanninen, and Carson, 1997). In this
note, we show that failure to impose certain restrictions implied by the nature of starting-point
bias will lead to inconsistent estimates of the structural parameters. Using a Monte Carlo
simulation, we find that failure to impose these restrictions leads to a substantial overestimate of
starting-point bias and evidence of incentive incompatibility even when none exists in the actual
data. Our theoretical arguments are laid out in Section 2 and supported with a simple Monte
Carlo experiment in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.

2. Theoretical Model

Consider the valuation of a public good via a double-bounded dichotomous-choice
questionnaire. 2 As in Whitehead (2002) and Herriges and Shogren (1996), assume that
respondent i, i = 1, ... , n, is given an initial bid Ali and answers "yes" ifher true willingness to
pay, WTP li , is greater than Ali and answers "no" otherwise. Assume the respondent's true
willingness to pay is generated according to
lThe authors acknowledge support from the National Science Foundation grant #0108159.
2For simplicity, we only consider the double-bounded dichotomous-choice model. Extending the model to
allow for multiple dichotomous-choice questions is a straightforward exercise.
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(1)
where Xi is a vector of explanatory variables observable to the researcher, J3 is a vector of
coefficients, and Ei is an unobservable i.i.d. normally distributed error term. If the respondent
answers "yes" to the initial willingness-to-pay question, then a follow-up bid A2i > Ali is given,
otherwise A2i < Ali. 3 The respondent's answer to this follow-up question is determined by the
WTP function
WTP2i

= (1- y)WTPli + yAli + 8.

(2)

WTP 2i is therefore a weighted average of the true willingness to pay and the opening bid plus a
"shift" parameter, 8. Starting-point bias (i.e., "anchoring" to the initial bid) exists if 0 < Y < 1
and does not exist if y = O. Likewise, incentive incompatibility exists (does not exist) if 8 < 0,
(8 = 0).
Whitehead (2002) then proposes an empirical test for starting-point bias and incentive
incompatibility by creating a pseudo-panel dataset and estimating the parameters using a
random-effects probit model. According to (1) and (2), the probability that the
answers "yes" to the /h question, j

=

ith

respondent

1,2, is
(3)

where <l> represents the standard normal cumulative density function, cr represents a constant
error variance, D2

=

1, Dl

=

0, and Aji = (1- J3 A)A jiD j' Other than specifying logarithmic

willingness to pay, there are two crucial differences between (3) and Whitehead's equation (10)both of which are associated with restrictions related to the nature of the starting-point bias.
First, Whitehead omits the Aji term altogether, which leads to inconsistent estimates of the

3Without loss of generality, we assume that A2i = 2Ali when the initial willingness-to-pay question is
answered "yes" and A2i = O.SAJi when answered "no."
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parameters (Greene 2003, page 679). Second, it must be recognized-based on equation (2)-that
the parameters in (3) are interrelated according to
~y

= y/(1-y)

(4 a)
(4b)
(4c)

Failure to impose these restrictions leads to inefficient (and if Aji is omitted, inconsistent)
estimates of the structural parameters. 4 We now tum to a Monte Carlo experiment, which serves
to support our theoretical arguments.

3. Monte Carlo Experiment
Begin by assuming that respondent i's true willingness to pay is given by
(5)
where {Xi} are fixed draws from a uniform distribution on the (0,1) interval and {Ei} are drawn
at random from a standard normal distribution. The willingness-to-pay value used for the second
valuation question is given by (2).
For this experiment, we assume that there is no incentive incompatibility (8

=

0) and a

moderate amount of starting-point bias (y = 0.25). Based on (2) and (5), we then create 500
artificial data sets (n = 1000 each) by drawing 500 independent sequences of {Ei}. The opening
bids, Ali, are drawn with equal probability from the set {4,5, ... , 16}. This range is
approximately two standard deviations above and below the expected willingness-to-pay value

4An alternative interpretation of the differences between (3) and Whitehead's equation (10) is that the
model with starting-point bias suffers from within-group heteroscedasticity. To see this, substitute (4a) - (4c) into
(3), which gives Prob(WTP li > Ali) = <1>((WX i - AlYcr) and Prob(WTP 2i > A2i) = <1>(((1 - y)WX i + yAli + 0A 2i )/cr*), where cr* = (1-y)cr. It is especially important to account for this within-group heteroscedasticity when
estimating binary-choice models, because unlike standard regression models, it leads to inconsistent estimates of the
structural parameters (Greene 2003, page 679).
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of 10. The subsequent bids, A2i , are set equal to 0.5Al i ifWTP1 i < Ali and 2Ali otherwise. As in
Whitehead (2002), we create pseudo-panel data with a dependent variable equal to one if
WTPji > Aji for j

=

1,2 and zero otherwise. The parameters in (3) are estimated using a random-

effects probit model with the correlation parameter (p) for the within-group error terms set equal
to one.5 ,6 This restriction on p is consistent with the theory presented above and Whitehead
(2002), where the only fundamental error term is the group-specific one (Ei).
In the third column of Table 1, we report the average parameter estimates across the 500
simulations excluding Aji and without having imposed the parameter restrictions (4a)-( 4c). The
estimates in the fourth column are based on (3) with the parameter restrictions imposed. The
values in brackets are the cutoff values for the 90-percent confidence intervals across the 500
simulations. Asterisks indicate that the parameter estimates are statistically different than their
corresponding true parameter values.
[Insert Table 1]
Begin by focusing on the third column of Table l. For four of the model's five
parameters, we rej ect the null hypothesis that the estimates are equal to their true values at the
90% level. This supports the theoretical argument that the estimated parameters without
imposing the appropriate restrictions are biased and inconsistent. It is interesting to note that
although the true model is designed to be incentive compatible, the maximum likelihood
estimates indicate substantial incentive incompatibility-the shift effect is roughly 30% of the
average willingness to pay. In addition, the average estimate of starting-point bias is

5The

"within-group error terms" to which we refer are

6The

log likelihood function for this problem is

Ei

and (1 - Y)Ei, the latter being implicit in (2).

Lf= 1Li = 1Yis log(p is)

where s indexes the four regions
th
associated with respondents' answers to the bids A I i and A 2b Yis is a indicator variable equal to one if the i
respondent places herself in the sth region, and Pis is the probability (given by the bivariate cumulative normal
distribution with p= 1) that the ith respondent is in the sth region.
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approximately one and a halftimes its actual value. These biases are the direct result of having
excluded the term Aji and not having imposed the appropriate restrictions (4a)-(4c). 7
Interestingly, the biases associated with the parameter estimates do not appear to bias the overall
mean WTP estimate.
The last column of Table 1 reports the estimates including Aji and with parameter
restrictions (4a)-(4c) imposed. As expected, we fail to reject the null hypotheses that each
parameter estimate is equal to its associated true value. This supports our theoretical argument
that a modified version of Whitehead's model, one that appropriately incorporates restrictions
associated with the nature of starting-point bias, provides a consistent method to test and control
for starting-point bias and incentive incompatibility. Indeed, failure to impose these restrictions
results in biased and inconsistent parameter estimates.

4. Conclusion
The model proposed by Whitehead (2002) provides a convenient and straightforward
method to control for incentive compatibility and starting-point bias in a dichotomous-choice
iterative WTP question format. However, if the restrictions implied by the structural model are
not specifically imposed on the empirical model, inconsistent estimates are obtained for each of
the structural parameters. We demonstrate this result with a simple Monte Carlo experiment.
We find that the degree of starting-point bias is overstated and that incentive incompatibility
arises even when none exists in the actual data. To obtain consistent estimates of incentive
compatibility and starting-point bias, it is therefore necessary for researchers to impose the
restrictions implied by Whitehead's theoretical model directly in the estimation procedure.

7We also performed Monte Carlo experiments with n = 10,000. The results are very similar to those
reported in Table 1, albeit with smaller confidence intervals, and are available from the authors by request.

6

References
Alberini, Anna, Barbara Kanninen, and Richard T. Carson. 1997. "Modeling Response Incentive
Effects in Dichotomous Choice Contingent Valuation Data." Land Economics
73 :309-324.
Boyle, Kevin J., Richard C. Bishop, and Michael P. Welsh. 1985. "Starting Point Bias in
Contingent Valuation Bidding Games." Land Economics 61: 188-194.
Cameron, Trudy Ann, and John Quiggin. 1994. "Estimation using Contingent Valuation Data
from a 'Dichotomous Choice with Follow-up' Questionnaire." Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 27 :218-234.
Greene, William H. Econometric Analysis, 5th ed. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, New
Jersey, 2003.
Herriges, Joseph A., and Jason F. Shogren. 1996. "Starting Point Bias in Dichotomous Choice
Valuation with Follow-Up Questioning." Journal ofEnvironmental Economics and
Management 30:112-131.
Whitehead, John C. 2002. "Incentive Incompatibility and Starting-Point Bias in Iterative
Valuation Questions." Land Economics 78(2):285-297.

7
Table 1. Monte Carlo Parameter Estimates (n = 1000)
True
Without Parameter
Parameters
Values
Restrictions and A

With Parameter
Restrictions and A

5

5.374*
[5.139,5.627]

4.990
[4.743,5.253]

10

9.227*
[8.845,9.619]

10.020
[9.582,10.476]

y
(Starting-Point
Bias)

0.25

0.358*
[0.316,0.401 ]

0.251
[0.223,0.274]

8
(Incentive
Incompatibility)

o

-3.175*
[-3.547,-2.812]

0.008
[-0.184,0.180]

cr
(Error Standard
Deviation)

1

0.926
[0.825,1.019]

0.990
[0.878,1.094 ]

Mean WTP

10

9.987
[9.839,10.136]

10.000
[9.852,10.149]

~o

(Intercept)

~1

(Slope)

Notes: The values in the last two columns are the ensemble averages across 500 independent
simulations. The values in brackets are the lower and upper bounds for a 90% confidence
interval. A single asterisk denotes a value that is statistically different than the true value at the
90% confidence level.

